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Abstract 
In order to achieve cost-effective RES-E deployment it is often argued that technology-neutral 
support schemes for renewables are indispensable. Against this background, RES-E support 
policies making widely use of technology differentiation in remuneration settings, e.g. across 
the EU, are frequently criticized from a theoretical point of view. However, in this paper we 
provide a systematic critique of the technology neutrality concept as a foundation for 
designing policy support schemes in the RES-E technology field. Specifically, the main 
objective of the paper is to scrutinize the arguments for technology-neutrality, and discuss 
three conceptual arguments for why technology-specific support schemes could in fact help 
minimize the societal costs of reaching future RES-E targets. We also briefly address different 
political economy concerns, which could constrain the choice of cost-effective policy support 
schemes, and that have to be taken into account for economic policy advice. For empirical 
illustration of the key arguments we refer to the case of German RES-E support. 
Keywords: Renewable energy technologies; technology-specific support; market failures; 
Germany.  
JEL classification: O38, Q42, Q48, Q55 
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1 Introduction 
An increased use of renewable energy sources is considered necessary for a transition towards 
a carbon-free and sustainable society, and many countries have introduced policy schemes 
(e.g., feed-in tariffs, certificate schemes, tendering procedures etc.) supporting the deployment 
of renewable energy technologies such as wind power and solar photovoltaics (PV). However, 
while there is still a controversial debate among economists on the general need for such 
policies (Fankhauser et al., 2010; Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; 
Söderholm and Klaassen, 2007), particularly, there exist different views on how the specific 
policy schemes, if ever implemented, should be designed in practice. In this paper we address 
the issue of whether the granted remuneration for renewables for electricity – i.e., a certain 
price premium per kWh – should be differentiated on the basis of inter- or intra-technology 
differences, or if it instead should be technology-neutral.1  
Many support schemes for electric power generated from renewable energy sources (RES-E) 
in Europe grant technology-specific support. The German scheme mandated by the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) is a prominent example 
(see Table 1). The German tariff levels are differentiated based on the energy sources 
employed, the specific technology, capacity and location of a plant as well as, for biomass, the 
substrates used in a plant. In addition, the dynamic tariff adjustment rules (degression rates, 
so-called “breathing caps” etc.) as well as the basic tariff scheme (fixed tariffs vs. premium 
tariffs, administratively set tariffs vs. tenders) vary with technologies.  
However, this approach of technology-specific RES-E support has been criticized, primarily 
since it is argued to make the attainment of RES-E deployment targets unnecessarily costly 
(e.g., Frontier Economics, 2012; Frontier Economics, 2014; Frontier Economics and r2b, 
2013; Fürsch et al., 2010; Jägemann, 2014; Jägemann et al., 2013). Lauber (2004) notes that 
in the European Union (EU), quota-based renewable certificate schemes have often been 
favored by DG Competition. These schemes have been considered as an ideal case of 
technology-neutral support2, and have therefore been perceived to better promote a cost-
effective deployment of RES-E compared to technology-specific feed-in tariff schemes. Over 
the years the European Commission has continued to express support for the use of 
technology-neutral support schemes; it however also acknowledges that in view of the 
different stage of technological development of renewable energy technologies, technology-
specific schemes may also be motivated (e.g., European Commission, 2013a, b, c, 2014).  
Technically the link between technology-neutrality and cost-effectiveness lies in the notion 
that a given RES-E deployment target can only be achieved at minimum costs if the net 
marginal costs across all relevant RES-E technologies are equalized. The net marginal cost in 
                                                     
1 In practice, the implementation of technology-specific RES-E support may be based on differentiation across 
technologies as well as within a given technology (e.g., the latter with respect to size, geographical location, fuel 
use etc.). This paper primarily addresses the former, although we also recognize that various versions of some 
renewable energy technology may have reached different levels of technological maturity (e.g., onshore versus 
offshore wind power). 
2 Even though the practice in the United Kingdom, where in fact technology-specific bands have been 
implemented for the quota system, tells otherwise (Helm, 2010). 
3 
 
turn equals the marginal cost of RES-E generation minus the marginal value of RES-E; in 
other words, it can be interpreted as the extra remuneration (e.g., per kWh) needed to 
incentivize investment. If this cost-effectiveness criterion is not met, the support scheme in 
place cannot ensure that the least costly RES-E technologies in a given allocation period are 
deployed first. For instance, Jägemann (2014) employs an electricity optimization model to 
show that the German feed-in tariff schemes for wind power and solar PV impose substantial 
excess costs for complying with the country’s RES 2020 target; this is in part due to the 
comparatively generous production support to offshore wind power and solar PV compared to 
onshore wind power referring to different market cost levels . Thus, the remuneration levels 
for PV and offshore-wind often reach double the size of that granted to onshore wind power 
(see Table 1).  
A number of previous studies have already questioned the rationale for relying on technology-
neutral RES-E support schemes (e.g., Sandén and Azar, 2005; Azar and Sandén, 2011; 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011), typically emphasizing the role for this type of support in 
promoting technological development. Different technologies, the argument goes, tend to face 
unique and multi-dimensional growth processes, e.g., in terms of bottlenecks, learning 
processes, the dynamics of the capital goods industries etc. This thus necessitates the use of 
differentiated policies; with technology-neutral support there is a risk that market actors will 
devote too little attention to RES-E technologies that are currently relatively expensive but yet 
holding a great potential for improved cost performances in the future.  
Yet another argument for the reliance on technology-specific RES-E support has been that 
such policy schemes may decrease final consumer prices despite the presence of excess 
generation costs, this since price discrimination across technologies with different marginal 
costs may help to reap producer rents (see, e.g., del Rio and Cerdá, 2014; Held et al., 2014; 
Resch et al., 2014). Generally, the design of the RES-E support schemes could therefore also 
be based on motives beyond cost-effectiveness, i.e., distributional concerns and other political 
economy considerations. 
In this paper we provide a systematic critique of the technology neutrality concept as a 
foundation for designing policy support schemes in the RES-E technology field. The starting 
point of the analysis is the notion that the standard cost-effectiveness argument for a 
technology-neutral RES-E support rests on at least two important assumptions: 
• Efficient competition between RES-E generation technologies on the basis of present 
generation costs 
• A focus on private generation costs, assuming that external costs do not exist or that these 
are perfectly internalized by other public policies 
Both assumptions thus relate to a relatively simple concept of static cost-effectiveness. 
Against this observation, we discuss three conceptual arguments for why technology-specific 
support schemes could in fact help minimize the costs of reaching future RES-E targets: (a) 
technology market failures, (b) obstacles to long-term risk taking (both arguments take a 
dynamic perspective of technological development considering also future generation costs), 
and (c) generation externalities (considering social costs) We also briefly address different 
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political economy concerns, which could constrain the choice of cost-effective policy support 
schemes, e.g., due to the need to maintain legitimacy for the policy and/or satisfy the interests 
of different stakeholder groups. 
 
Table 1: Examples of technology differentiation in Germany under the 2014 Renewable 
Energy Sources Act.  
Object of 
differentiation 
Base of 
differentiation 
Specification in the 2014 German Renewable Energy Sources Act 
(Examples) 
Tariff level (Art. 
40-54 EEG 2014) 
Energy source • Geothermal: 25.20 Cent/kWh 
• Solar: 9.23-13.15 Cent/kWh  
• Biomass: 5.85-23.73 Cent/kWh 
• Landfill gas: 5.83-8.42 Cent/kWh 
• Sewage gas: 5.83-6.69 Cent/kWh  
• Wind onshore: 4.95-8.90 Cent/kWh 
• Wind offshore: 3.90-19.40 Cent/kWh 
• Mine gas: 3.80-6.74 Cent/kWh  
• Hydropower: 3.50-12.52 Cent/kWh 
Plant technology • Higher support for solar energy plants mounted on buildings (9.23-13.15 
Cent/kWh) than for ground-based plants (9.23 Cent/KWh) 
• Premium for flexible biogas generation 
• No support for hydropower plants with insurmountable dams 
Plant capacity • Stepwise decrease of tariff with increasing plant capacity for hydropower, 
mining, landfill, sewage gas, biomass, solar 
• Example hydropower: 
≤ 500 kW: 12.52 Cent/kWh 
≤ 2 MW: 8.25 Cent/kWh 
≤ 5 MW: 6.32 Cent/kWh 
≤ 10 MW: 5.54 Cent/kWh 
≤ 20 MW: 5.34 Cent/kWh 
≤ 50 MW: 4.28 Cent/kWh 
> 50 MW: 3.50 Cent/kWh 
Plant location • Support for wind onshore increases with decreasing wind yield (reference 
yield model) 
• Support for wind offshore increases with increasing distance to shore and 
depth of sea 
• No support for wind offshore in protected areas 
Substrate (for 
biomass) 
• Biogas from fermented manure: 23.73 Cent/kWh 
• Biogas from fermented biological waste: 13.38-15.26 Cent/kWh 
• Biomass according to Biomass Ordinance: 5.85-13.66 Cent/kWh 
• Additional pre-qualification criteria apply for each type of substrate 
Tariff degression 
rate (Art. 26-31 
EEG 2014) 
Energy source • Solar: 6.2 % p.a. 
• Geothermal: 5.0 % p.a. (starting 2018) 
• Biomass: 2.0 % p.a. 
• Wind onshore: 1.6 % p.a. 
• Mining, landfill, sewage gas: 1.5 % p.a.  
• Hydropower: 0.5 % p.a. 
• Wind offshore: 0.5 Cent/kWh/a in 2018, 1.0 Cent/kWh/a in 2020,  
0.5 Cent/kWh/a starting from 2021 
Breathing cap 
(reduction/increase 
of tariff if annual 
deployment target 
is exceeded/not 
reached) (Art. 3 
EEG 2014) 
Energy source • Not defined for wind offshore, geothermal, mining, landfill and sewage gas, 
hydropower 
• Wind onshore: 2,400-2,600 MW/a 
• Solar energy: 2,400-2,600 MW/a (in addition total cap of 52,000 MW 
installed) 
• Biomass: 100 MW/a 
• In addition, adjustment rates for tariffs applying if caps are not met vary 
with energy sources 
Basic tariff scheme 
(Art. 37, Art. 55 
EEG 2014) 
Energy source/plant 
technology 
• Tenders for ground-based solar power plants  
• Administratively set tariffs for other energy sources and technologies 
Plant size  • Premium tariff mandatory for plants larger than 100 kW  
• Smaller plants can opt for fixed tariff 
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In order to empirically illustrate the relevance of our main arguments for practical policy-
making, the paper refers to the case of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), 
where appropriate. However, neither our conceptual analysis nor the discussion of the case 
study do suggest that the ways in which the existing technology-specific RES-E support 
schemes are designed, e.g., in Germany, do promote a cost-effective deployment of 
technologies. Rather, we make the point that technology-specific RES-E support is not by 
definition violating the social cost minimization criterion, but its impact depends on sundry 
cost conditions, and that economic rationales in favor of technology-specific support should 
play a certain role for real-world policy making.  
In the remainder of this paper we argue that a rationale for technology-specific RES-E support 
is likely to emerge once one (or both) of the above assumptions is (are) relaxed (see section 
2). Moreover, and as noted above, an additional assumption underlying the quest for 
technology neutrality could be the ignorance of different political economy constraints, e.g., 
distributional concerns. The consequences of relaxing also this assumption are briefly 
discussed in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 Three Cost-Effectiveness Reasons for Technology-Specific RES-E 
Support 
In this section we identify and discuss three general arguments for why the use of technology-
specific support policies may, if properly designed, help achieve long-term RES-E targets at 
minimum cost to society. These rationales include: (a) different types of technology market 
failures impairing future progress in RES-E technologies; (b) capital market failures and other 
obstacles to long-term risk-taking; and (c) the presence of (non-internalized) external costs 
from RES-E generation. The relevance of these arguments for the German case is outlined in 
section 2.4. 
2.1 Technology Market Failures Impairing Improvements in Future Cost 
Performance  
The development of RES-E technologies may be impaired by the presence of technology 
market failures, thus implying that private investors face too weak incentives to undertake the 
investments needed to bring down the costs of these technologies. The economics literature 
has in particular stressed the risk for the under-provision of R&D as a public good; private 
companies will typically be able to appropriate only a fraction of the total rate-of-return on 
their R&D investment since substantial benefits will also accrue to other companies (e.g., 
through reverse engineering or staff movements between companies). This may motivate the 
use of public subsidies to private R&D (e.g., Gillingham et al., 2008).  
However, technological breakthroughs following past R&D investment are followed by often 
long processes of incremental improvements along a fairly well-defined trajectory. This will 
in turn affect future innovations (the re-development of a technology) through different 
learning processes. Experiences of the production and use of a technology often lead to the 
encountering of new problems and the discovery of new opportunities, thus raising the rate-
of-return on additional R&D (e.g., Huenteler et al., 2012; Rosenberg, 1982). Increased RES-E 
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generation today may therefore help to bring down generation costs in the future due to 
processes characterized by both learning-by-doing (i.e., tacit knowledge acquired through 
manufacturing) and learning-by-using (i.e., improvements in the technology as a result of 
feedback from user experiences).  
Also the benefits from these learning processes will often be difficult to appropriate in full for 
single investors, and a number of factors support the argument that these spillovers could be 
particularly prevalent in the energy sector (e.g., Neuhoff, 2005). For instance, in the energy 
sector the end product is homogenous and companies primarily compete on the basis of costs; 
there is therefore little room for product differentiation and thus an absence of customers with 
varied preferences who are willing to purchase the product even at a higher price (Kalkuhl et 
al., 2012). Moreover, the scope for patenting new innovations could be relatively limited (e.g., 
compared to the pharmaceutical sector), in part since RES-E technologies consist of a large 
number of components that require expertise from several companies to be improved. 
Given the need for introducing RES-E support due to the presence of learning spillovers, the 
important point to make here is that the granted support (i.e., the price premium) needs to be 
technology-specific as long as the RES technologies are heterogeneous in terms of: (a) the 
sizes of the respective learning effects; and (b) the extent to which the knowledge generated 
from learning cannot be appropriated by the companies that contribute to it. 
Previous studies suggest that both of these two conditions hold empirically. First, in a recent 
survey of previous estimates of RES-E learning rates, i.e., measures of the percentage rate 
declines in generation costs following a doubling of cumulative capacities or production 
levels, Rubin et al. (2015) find significant differences across technologies. For instance, the 
learning rates are generally lower for onshore wind power and hydropower compared to solar 
PV. Second, the empirical evidence on learning spillovers from RES-E technologies is more 
limited, but it also points towards a need for technology differentiation. Noailly and 
Shestalova (2013) provide an assessment of knowledge spillovers by relying on patent 
citation count data. They conclude that knowledge spillovers from solar PV and wind power 
are generally more prevalent compared to those emanating from the fossil-fuel technologies, 
but they also differ across RES-E technologies (e.g., being more profound for wind power 
compared to solar PV). Examining the case of Germany, Cantner et al. (2016) show in 
addition that the characteristics of inventor networks vary with RES-E technologies and are, 
in consequence, affected differently by various types of policy instruments. 
Even though it should be clear that these empirical assessments are associated with a fair 
amount of uncertainties,3 there is little to suggest that the degree of learning market failures is 
uniform across the various RES-E technologies. The observed variations are likely due to 
different technological maturity levels, and could emerge as a result of differences in the 
complexity of the relevant actor networks as well as the role of users in the technology 
development process. For instance, the technological progress of wind power has largely been 
                                                     
3 Many learning studies are not able to adequately separate endogenous learning effects from both exogenous 
technological change and economies of scale (e.g., Nordhaus, 2014; Söderholm and Sundqvist, 2007). For 
instance, in the solar PV field significant technological progress has resulted from investments made outside the 
RES-E sector, such as in the semiconductor industry (e.g., Nemet, 2006).  
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driven by turbine manufacturers and the existence of strong home markets, while equipment 
suppliers and manufacturers that produce their own equipment have dominated solar PV 
development (e.g., Huenteler et al., 2012).  
When introducing support schemes in a specific country, one must also take into account that 
RES-E technology development takes place on a global scale with significant international 
learning spillovers. For a single country this raises the question about in which technologies it 
has a comparative advantage, and to what extent the domestic economy can appropriate the 
learning benefits emanating from the implementation of RES-E support schemes. Peters et al. 
(2012) study solar PV development, and conclude that the international learning spillovers 
from solar PV production support schemes have tended to be more prevalent than the corre-
sponding spillovers from public R&D. In addition, as noted above, some RES-E technologies 
(e.g., wind power) tend to be more dependent on a home market than others, e.g., making 
possible important interactions between basic knowledge generation and learning-by-using 
etc. Still, while these considerations may render difficult choices and trade-offs in the design 
of domestic policies, neither of these should suggest a strong emphasis on technology-neutral 
RES-E support.  
Our discussion so far in this sub-section suggests that ignoring the often technology-specific 
learning effects will lead to underinvestment in the RES-E technologies with great long-term 
potentials for cost reductions. It is also important, though, to recognize that this effect may be 
reinforced by the presence of path dependencies and technology lock-in. Path dependencies 
will in part arise since the knowledge accumulation processes are sector-specific (Acemoglu 
et al., 2012). In simple terms this will imply that if current investments in technology-specific 
human and physical capital are biased towards technologies with limited potentials for future 
cost reductions, this could lower the pay-off of directing future development activities 
towards other more promising technologies that cannot make any use of this capital. Such 
path dependencies may in turn be reinforced by the institutional frameworks (i.e. legal rules, 
codes of conduct etc.) that co-evolve with the technologies, thus further increasing the costs 
of exploring alternative technological trajectories (Prado and Trebilcock, 2009).  
The electric power sector exhibits several characteristics, which are likely to generate path de-
pendencies. Investments in this sector are large-scale, long-term and exhibit increasing returns 
from technology adoption (Neuhoff, 2005). The sector is also highly regulated, implying that 
existing technological patterns tend to be embedded into – and enforced by – a complex set of 
institutions. The empirical relevance of these effects is also likely to differ across various RES 
technologies. Investments in new RES-E capacity are capital-intensive, and as the investment 
costs of existing technologies are sunk this capacity will compete with new capacity purely on 
the basis of their variable costs.  
The greater the difference between the total cost of a new plant and the variable cost of the 
existing plant, the greater the incentive for better and more intense use of existing capacity, 
i.e., through higher capacity utilization, life time extensions, and incremental capacity 
additions (e.g., Söderholm, 2001). Some new RES-E technologies may be more aligned with 
existing institutions than others, thus lowering the cost of new plants. In addition, for some 
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technologies increases in RES-E generation within existing technologies, e.g., co-firing with 
biomass in combined heat and power plants, are easier than for others. Thus, a strong reliance 
on technology-neutral support schemes in favor of initially low-cost technologies may create 
inefficient lock-in effects in the long run. 
2.2 Capital Market Failures and other Obstacles to Long-term Risk-taking 
Another important factor potentially affecting the design of RES-E support schemes relates to 
the uncertainties and risks facing both firms and governments, as well as the limited ability of 
the capital market to address the issue of long-term risk-taking. For potential RES-E investors 
the uncertainties relate to, for instance, the extent of the technological learning benefits, the 
future development of energy prices, and the trajectories of climate and energy policies.  
In theory the private investors should be able to hedge against the resulting risks, and would 
then be indifferent between RES-E investments with different risk profiles as long as the 
expected return on investment is equal. However, in practice capital and insurance markets 
are unlikely to ensure such outcomes, e.g., due to moral hazard problems. The capital markets 
often face difficulties in providing risk management instruments for the immature RES-E 
technologies, in part due to a lack of historical data to assess risk (Neuhoff, 2005).4 Moreover, 
since RES-E projects are often small-scale, transaction costs for risk management and 
financing arrangements may be disproportionally high.  
The main implication of these capital market failures is that private investors will discount 
uncertain future income streams more strongly than public investors. This type of myopic 
investment behavior may also result from other factors, such as the fact that firm managers 
tend to be appointed only for shorter periods. Moreover, Stein (1989) argues that due to 
agency problems within firms, private decision-making may be inefficient with a bias towards 
short-term payoffs, thus resulting in myopic behavior also in the presence of efficient capital 
markets.5  
This is in turn likely to affect different technologies to varying degrees; overall there will be a 
bias away from the relatively capital-intensive RES-E technologies such as wind power while 
favoring the currently cost-effective technologies with short payback periods (Neuhoff and De 
Vries, 2004). The risk profiles for different RES-E technologies may also differ due to 
technological complexity. Technologies incorporating a large amount of technical 
components or depending on a larger variety of inputs for plant production (e.g., diverse rare 
earth metals for solar PV) or power generation (e.g., different biomass feedstock) are likely 
subject to higher multiplicative risks.  
                                                     
4 In some developing countries there may even be a genuine lack of financial institutions that would allow 
savings from traditional sectors to be used to finance investments in new sectors and immature technologies.  
5 The way in which the patent system is structured in most countries may even create a bias towards the 
development of close-to-commercial technologies. The reason is that while patents award innovators a certain 
period of market exclusivity (e.g., 20 years), the effective term may be considerably shorter since some firms 
choose to file patents at the time of discovery rather than at first sale. This implies that the patent system will 
tend to provide meager incentives for firms to engage in R&D focusing on technologies that have a long time 
between invention and commercialization (Budish et al., 2015).  
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There may be several ways of addressing these types of capital market failures and firm 
inefficiencies directly. Yet the feasibility of many policy options may be limited. For instance, 
in principle the risks facing RES-E generators could be eliminated through the use of long-
term contracts between final consumers and the owners of the producing plants, but in 
liberalized electricity markets such practices are prevented due to regulations aiming at 
fostering retail competition (Neuhoff and De Vries, 2004). In the presence of such constraints, 
RES-E support schemes may turn out to be a feasible, though only second- or third-best 
option. The important point to make here is that if such schemes are implemented to address 
these problems, the support levels should ideally be technology-specific due to the 
heterogeneous risk profiles for different RES technologies.  
Of course, the regulators who decide to design and implement RES-E schemes will also have 
to address considerable uncertainties about future market developments etc., and the design of 
efficient technology-specific support schemes is likely to be particularly demanding in terms 
of information. In the light of the future risks and uncertainties regulators should therefore in 
general avoid supporting “single winners”, and instead provide support for several emerging 
RES-E technologies (that are not perfect substitutes) to reduce uncertainties (e.g., Aalbers et 
al., 2013; Azar and Sandén, 2011). However, this should not be seen as an argument against 
technology differentiation; it rather tends to highlight an additional reason for the preferential 
treatment of specific technologies.  
Specifically, a few RES-E technologies, often referred to as backstop technologies, may play 
a particularly important role in bringing down the cost of complying with ambitious long-term 
climate mitigation targets. A true backstop technology is available in more or less unlimited 
quantities at some given (sometimes relatively high) cost (Nordhaus, 1973). For this reason a 
backstop technology may help to put a cap on the cost of reaching strict emission reduction 
targets, i.e., given the uncertainties about future climate damages it represents an insurance 
against high costs (Fischer et al., 2012). Some RES-E technologies are more likely to exhibit 
important backstop characteristics than other. For instance, compared to biomass the scarcity 
constraints are likely to be less prevalent in the case of solar PV. The flow of solar energy to 
earth is abundant, and solar panels can be placed on roofs. Support schemes that can bring 
down the cost of, for instance, solar PV can therefore have an added insurance value 
compared to biomass energy.  
2.3 Heterogeneity of External Costs and Benefits of RES-E Generation 
A cost-effectiveness assessment of RES-E technologies must also take into account the fact 
that the direct (market) costs of these technologies will not necessarily include a number of 
external costs and benefits. This may be due to the presence of different types of externalities 
that have not been properly internalized by means of other policies and regulations. In this 
sub-section we comment on three different types of RES-E externalities: (a) the external 
environmental costs and benefits; (b) the costs of electric power system integration; and (c) 
the external costs in terms of safeguarding energy security. In all three cases we are likely to 
experience differences in costs across the various RES-E technologies, thus suggesting that 
any non-internalized costs could be addressed through the use of support schemes that 
differentiate the support level on the basis of these differences. Although such schemes will 
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only be a second-best means to address any remaining externalities, there is nevertheless little 
support for the adoption of a completely technology-neutral policy approach in these cases.  
First, RES-E deployment may generate environmental costs but also benefits in terms of, for 
instance, the avoided pollution from plants being replaced by increased RES-E generation, 
and both costs and benefits tend to be heterogeneous across RES-E technologies. The external 
costs of RES-E generation can be site-specific (e.g., habitat losses, water and air pollution 
etc.) and/or distance-related, i.e., dependent on the distances to human settlements (e.g., noise 
emissions, air pollution, aesthetical changes to landscapes etc.) (e.g., Abbasi and Abbasi, 
2000). Although it may be difficult to determine the extent to which these cost are already 
internalized, important differences in external costs are likely to exist. For instance, in their 
empirical survey of the external environmental costs of power generation Söderholm and 
Sundqvist (2006) conclude that in general these costs tend to be higher for biomass generation 
than for both wind power and solar PV. Their review also identifies substantial variances in 
external cost estimates for each of the RES-E technologies (e.g., due to different geographical 
contexts).  
Furthermore, previous studies have pointed out that important differences across RES-E 
technologies also exist in terms of avoided air pollution, thus also questioning the commonly 
used assumption that the marginal generation source displaced equals the average generation 
mix in the electricity system. One recent example is Novan (2015) who concludes that in the 
Texas electricity market an increase in wind power will offset more carbon dioxide emissions 
than a corresponding increase in solar PV generation (see also Kaffine et al., 2013).6 
Obviously, the first-best policy response is to target these externalities directly (e.g., by 
emissions taxes and standards or land use planning). However, if such approach is not feasible 
in practice, RES-E support schemes could represent a decent second-best approach. This 
unfeasibility might be the case due to, e.g., practical limits of tackling a high number of 
complex environmental externalities associated with RES-E generation in a first-best way at 
the same time, spatial constraints of legislations to deal with regional spill-over effects or 
overall distributional concerns with respect to internalization policies. In this case, the 
heterogeneity in the externalities to be addressed can only be accounted for sufficiently by a 
corresponding degree of technology differentiation. 
Second, there are also the costs associated with system integration, and the fact that market 
values of renewable energy sources differ depending on timing (i.e., when they are available). 
These costs may include: (a) balancing costs, i.e., the marginal costs of coping with deviations 
from day-ahead generation schedules due to forecast errors for intermittent RES-E generation; 
(b) grid-related costs, i.e., the marginal costs of transmission constraints and losses due to the 
location of RES-E generation in the electricity grid; and (c) profile costs, i.e., the marginal 
                                                     
6 The timing and location of RES-E generation and the pre-existing mix of other energy sources will also affect 
what generation is displaced, and thus which environmental impacts are avoided. For instance, due to its 
intermittent nature wind power will sometimes tend to replace hydropower, which can easily be regulated to 
address different loads. Bioenergy in contrast can more easily be seen to replace fossil fuels, e.g., through co-
firing in combined heat and power plants.  
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cost of output adjustments and overall reduced use of conventional (e.g., thermal) electric 
power plants due to the timing of intermittent RES-E generation (Hirth et al., 2015).  
These system integration costs are clearly of a greater magnitude for intermittent RES-E gene-
ration (Joskow, 2011) but in many cases the existing regulatory framework may fail to 
internalize these costs properly. In Germany, this holds true because payments to RES-E 
generation are only weakly linked to wholesale prices (e.g., fixed feed-in tariffs and sliding 
premium tariffs are used instead of fixed premium tariffs).7 Moreover, the German electricity 
market fails to send proper investment and generation signals, inter alia, due to the design and 
timing of contracts traded, the absence of locational price signals etc. (Löschel et al., 2013). 
While the first-best response would be the reduction of these distortions, this may not be 
feasible due to politico-economic constraints and/or administrative hurdles. For example, the 
implementation of price zones would potentially lead to higher power prices in Southern 
Germany and is correspondingly likely to fail due to opposition from the Länder Bayern or 
Baden-Württemberg (Monopolkommission, 2015, p. 107). In this case, technology-specific 
RES-E support schemes may help promote a system-friendly RES-E portfolio and reduce 
integration costs. 
Third and finally, the literature on domestic energy security has identified a number of 
potential economic externalities arising from the level of fossil fuel (e.g., oil and natural gas) 
imports (e.g. Bohi and Toman, 1996). This type of externality may involve a direct and an 
indirect effect. The former involves the exercise of market power of, most notably, oil and 
natural gas exporters, while the latter refers to how fossil fuel imports may affect the macro-
economy through their impacts on inflation and the trade balance. It is worth underscoring 
that these economic externalities are concerned with economic costs and not with physical 
availability per se. In the presence of such energy security externalities, society is overall 
better off paying a premium on the price of fuels imported from dominant exporters.  
Similar to the case of environmental externalities, the first-best policy typically works by 
“getting the prices right”, i.e., with a correct price on imported fuels, firms and consumers 
will switch to other energy resources that are not associated with the same energy security 
externalities. However, quantifying the energy security externalities associated with oil or 
natural gas use could be more fraught with difficulties than environmental externalities 
(Gillingham and Sweeney, 2010). For this reason direct support for RES-E technologies may 
also here represent a decent second-best policy.  
Even though all RES-E technologies help reduce the dependence on imported fossil fuels, 
their impacts on overall energy security may not necessarily be homogeneous. One reason is 
that some RES-E generation will create new import dependencies, e.g., import of wood pellets 
in the case of biomass-fired generation. Although in such cases the distortion created by a 
technology-neutral scheme may perhaps be minor in the context of a single country, it may 
well become more profound in the case where technology-neutral schemes are integrated 
                                                     
7 For instance, if the generation of solar PV increases in southern Germany, this will lower the wholesale price of 
electricity in the relevant hours. This price fall should induce RES-E developers to choose better locations, i.e., 
with higher local prices. However, a contract price that is independent of the spot price suppresses efficient 
signals, in turn raising the cost of power generation.  
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across countries (e.g., Söderholm, 2008). The whole point of integrating different domestic 
support schemes is to permit a cost-effective location of RES-E generation, and thus enable 
increased electricity trade.  
Different countries are also likely to have different perceptions of the significance of the 
respective (energy security and environmental) externalities, thus implying different views on 
how much to support different RES-E technologies. This also implies that an EU-wide 
technology-neutral market approach will not be cost-effective (Strunz et al., 2015b). Since 
market valuation of externalities is lacking a political assessment is needed instead to cover 
regional preferences that may also be heterogeneous across both technologies and countries. 
2.4 Relevance of Theoretical Arguments for RES-E Policy-Making – The Case of 
Germany 
So far, we pointed out that there are economic rationales for having technology differentiation 
for RES-E policies in general, and that the empirical evidence suggests that these rationales 
are relevant. Moreover, respective policy patterns can be witnessed e.g. across EU member 
states, especially in Germany. However, the question arises whether the outlined arguments in 
favor of differentiation in fact do play any role for practical policy-making. Again, for 
illustration purposes, we refer to the German case. Whether the described economic rationales 
are also important for practical policy-making is discussed by a short review the official 
legislative reasoning of the German EEG.  
Addressing technology market failures. The official justification for the first version of the 
EEG, which entered into force in 2000, identified “a structural discrimination of new 
technologies” (Bundestag, 1999, p. 7, own translation) as a decisive reason for why the 
competition between RES-E and conventional energy technologies tends to be distorted. The 
EEG explicitly aimed to create demand for a range of renewable energy sources and 
technologies; the rationale was that individual technologies should be enabled to benefit from 
economies of scale, which would not take effect as long as the number of production units 
remained low (Bundestag, 1999, pp. 7f.). Technologies were distinguished according to their 
innovative potential, but also the role they were expected to play in the future electricity 
system – this is particularly evident in the case of solar PV, where comparatively high feed-in 
tariff rates were justified on the basis that mass production should bring down the costs of the 
RES-E technology with the largest expected long-term potential (Bundestag, 1999, p. 9).  
In addition, technology-specific digression rates for remuneration were established to follow 
technologies’ specific progression down the learning curve (Bundestag, 1999, p. 9; 2008a, pp. 
51ff.). Later versions of the EEG followed the logic that support should be continuously 
aligned with technologies’ state of development, to set incentives for further innovations 
(Bundestag, 2008a, p. 37). EEG amendments in 2004, 2009 and 2012 even established 
bonuses for particularly innovative, but high-cost technology choices (e.g. petrothermal 
systems for geothermal power, or gas processing for biogas plants) (Bundestag, 2008a, pp. 
56f.). In the EEG 2014, technology-specific expansion corridors are supposed to focus 
support on technologies comparatively close to competitiveness on the one hand (particularly 
onshore wind power and solar PV), but also technologies with a high remaining potential for 
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innovation on the other (such as wind offshore) (Bundestag, 2014, pp. 89f.). Besides the aim 
of enabling economies of scale and reducing the long-term costs of a reliable and 
environmentally friendly electricity supply, official justifications of the EEG also emphasize 
that supporting specific, innovative technologies can contribute towards building competitive 
advantages in global technology markets and increasing employment (Bundestag, 2008a, p. 
37; 2014, pp. 96f.). 
Addressing obstacles to long-term risk-taking. During the initial period of the EEG 
investment security played a major role for the regulator, and RES-E operators were released 
from any kinds of market risks (e.g., Bundestag, 1999, p. 10). And even with the gradual 
introduction of the (optional) sliding feed-in premium in the EEG 2012 and 2014 – meant to 
promote the market and system integration of RES – price risks have remained low for 
investors because the premium balances out the difference between politically set reference 
prices and average market prices (e.g., Sensfuß and Ragwitz, 2011). While the EEG 2014 
made direct marketing obligatory for all but small scale plants, it retained a fallback option 
with the explicit aim of reducing risks for plant operators (Bundestag, 2014, p. 91): under 
exceptional circumstances (e.g., insolvency of a direct marketing company) plant operators 
can count on transmission system operators (TSOs) to market their electricity at reduced feed-
in tariff rates (Art. 38 EEG 2014). From 2017, the level of the sliding feed-in premium will be 
determined through competitive bidding for most RES technologies; still, limiting risks for 
bidders remains a goal of the tender design process, in order to facilitate participation by 
small actors with particular high risk aversion or risk-bearing costs (BMWi, 2015, p. 5).  
Addressing external costs of RES-E generation. Regarding environmental externalities, the 
EEG’s remunerations scheme repeatedly draws on technology-specific ecological impacts, 
e.g., for hydropower and biomass through additional ecological eligibility criteria or different 
tariffs.8 In the case of hydropower, the EEG versions 2004, 2009 and 2012 included specific 
ecological criteria that projects had to meet in order to be eligible for support (Bundestag, 
2008b, p. 19). With the EEG 2014, these criteria were lifted, and included in the revised 
Water Management Act (“Wasserhaushaltsgesetz”) instead (Bundestag, 2014, p. 140). In the 
case of bioelectricity plants, sustainability certification for biofuels and bioliquids was 
adopted in 2009, to reflect concerns about the sustainability of imports (BioSt-NachV, 2009; 
Bundestag, 2008a, p. 30). The EEG 2012 excluded electricity produced from bioliquids and 
scrap wood from support altogether, because available energetic potentials were considered to 
be exhausted (BMU, 2011, pp. 85, 88; Bundesregierung, 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, the EEG 
2012 differentiated bioelectricity tariff rates according to classes of biomass substrates, with 
higher remuneration available for selected substrates where comparatively high costs went 
hand in hand with ecologically favorable characteristics (the so-called “substrate tariff class 
II”) (Bundestag, 2011b, p. 17). Moreover, a cap on the use of maize was introduced to reduce 
the loss of biodiversity due to an increased cultivation of monocultures. In order to improve 
the GHG balance of bioelectricity production, minimum requirements on slurry use or heat 
cogeneration were established, replacing earlier bonuses for these measures in the EEG 2009 
                                                     
8 The German Federal Government concedes that negative environmental impacts caused by wind turbines are 
sufficiently controllable by other jurisdictions (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 49). 
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(Bundesregierung, 2011, p. 15; Bundestag, 2011b, p. 31). In the EEG 2014, these measures 
were discontinued; instead, remuneration rates were subject to strong reductions, with the 
expectation that only projects using low competition, environmentally advantageous resources 
such as waste and residuals would remain profitable (Bundestag, 2014, p. 141). However, 
comparatively high cost-based remuneration remains for bio-degradable waste fermentation 
and small slurry installations. 
External benefits of contributions to electric power system integration and safeguarding 
energy security were considered, e.g., in an extra support scheme for biogas plants (flexibility 
premium), which was introduced in the EEG 2012 (Bundesregierung, 2011, p. 10). This 
premium is meant to incentivize switching from a base load to a demand-oriented production 
mode, and to compensate for additional investments associated with the flexibilization of 
plants (Rohrig et al., 2011). The EEG 2012 also ushered in the transition from a fixed feed-in 
tariff to a sliding feed-in premium, where RES producers are exposed to electricity price 
signals to a limited degree, to improve the alignment of feed-in and demand 
(Bundesregierung, 2011, p. 8; Klobasa et al., 2013). This so-called “market premium scheme” 
included a technology-specific management premium which was meant to compensate 
additional costs of marketing electricity directly, instead of via TSOs. To incentivize better 
system compatibility of wind and solar PV plants, higher management premium rates were 
offered to plants which could be remote controlled (Bundestag, 2012, p. 1). In the EEG 2014, 
however, remote control capability was made a prerequisite for receiving the feed-in premium 
(see Art. 35 sentence 1 no. 2 in conjunction with Art. 36 (1) EEG 2014).  
Again, these observations do not say much on whether the degree and complexity of the 
concrete differentiation outlined in Table 1 could ever be cost-effective. However, it 
demonstrates that our theoretical reasoning has been relevant for actual policy-making. In 
general, policy could benefit further by a more systematic empirical assessment of the 
different market failures outlined above. Our empirical understanding of these rationales need 
to be improved, not the least since their respective importance is likely to differ across 
countries and regions. 
3 Political Economy Constraints to Technology-Neutral Support 
While section 2 has provided a number of cost-effectiveness arguments for the introduction of 
technology-specific RES-E support, it is necessary to also discuss the political economy 
constraints that need to be addressed when designing RES-E support schemes in practice. 
These constraints arise since policy makers must maintain public support, and will therefore 
have to satisfy the interests of different stakeholder groups. Such considerations are likely to 
affect the degree of political feasibility of technology neutrality or differentiation of RES-E 
schemes, although overall, we argue, they might tend to endorse technology-specific support 
schemes. These constraints have to be taken into account when designing and suggesting 
economically rational policies from a theoretical point of view. Besides the mere feasibility 
issue, these constraints may also refer to some relevant and legitimate factors beyond cost-
effectiveness (e.g., distributional effects). 
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3.1 Meeting the Interests of Electricity Consumers 
An important interest group are electricity consumers, and it has been argued that technology-
specific RES-E support schemes lead to lower wind fall profits and thus consumer prices 
compared to technology-neutral schemes, this since price discrimination across technologies 
with different costs will help reap producer rents (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2010; del Rio and 
Cerdá, 2014; Held et al., 2014; Hitaj et al., 2014; Resch et al., 2014).9 From a political 
economy perspective, this redistribution of income from power generators to consumers may 
increase the public support for the RES-E policy in general. In principle, the windfall profit 
problem can also be addressed in the context of a technology-neutral scheme, not the least by 
taxing the excess rent (and redistribute the revenues to consumers). Such a tax could permit 
governments to capture a large share of the realized rents without greatly altering the extent or 
nature of RES-E generation. Still, it would be difficult to implement efficiently, and it would 
have negative impacts on ex ante investment incentives. 
For the German case we find some evidence on the relevance of the windfall profit argument 
for policy-making. To avoid windfall profits and high economic cost that consumers would 
have to bear the level of the feed-in tariff declines step-wise with increasing plant capacity 
(considering economies of scale) for many RES-E technologies (Bundestag, 2008a, p. 50). 
Moreover, the level of the feed-in tariff varies with wind yield to avoid excessive support on 
wind-intensive sites (Bundestag, 1999, p. 9). Finally, the political motive of „affordable 
energy supply“ newly shows up in the EEG 2014 itself (see objectives in Art. 1: “ to reduce 
the costs to the economy not least by including long-term external effects”). In any case, 
distributional concerns show up in the general climate and energy concept of the government 
(BMWi/BMU, 2010) and in Art. 1 of the German Energy Act (EnWG), mandating affordable 
and low cost (“preisgünstig”) energy supply. 
3.2 Meeting the Interests of RES-E Investors and Regions 
There are also the interests of a heterogeneous set of different types of sub-national regions 
and investors. First, there are technology-specific interests groups of manufacturers and 
operators of RES-E plants which seeking to maximize their individual rents. Moreover, the 
promotion of RES-E deployment is sometimes viewed as a vehicle for regional growth and 
job creation, especially in local communities with a declining population trend. Although one 
may question the role of RES-E support as an efficient labor market policy tool (see also 
Ejdemo and Söderholm, 2015), it should be clear that at the regional and local levels policy 
makers and citizens may express concerns about the regional distribution of RES-E 
generation and the technology choices involved. Regional stakeholders will likely lobby for 
supporting RES-E technologies that: (a) can make use of the region’s physical, natural and 
human capital, e.g., biomass in rural areas; (b) generate limited local environmental external 
costs; and (c) show promising local employment impacts. These considerations will likely not 
match the technology mix resulting from RES-E support schemes aiming at domestic cost-
effectiveness. In fact, technology-specific support facilitates the pinpoint distribution of rents 
                                                     
9 This does not suggest that there may not be windfall profits also in the case of technology-specific RES-E 
support schemes; some countries have introduced time-declining support levels to address such concerns 
(Hoppmann et al., 2014). The point is simply that the magnitude of the windfall profits will be more profound in 
the case of technology-neutral schemes.  
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to separate constituencies as it prevents competition between RES technologies and their 
interests groups (Aalbers et al., 2013; Helm, 2010; Strunz et al., 2015a). 
For the German case, there is clear empirical evidence, for example, that the technology-
specific rates under the German EEG have been driven by interventions from business groups 
as well as from the subnational administrations of the German Länder (Hoppmann et al., 
2014; Strunz et al., 2015a; Sühlsen and Hisschemöller, 2014; Vossler, 2014). When the 2014 
amendment to the EEG was negotiated, Northern Länder opposed tight caps on onshore wind 
power expansion (the economic repercussions of which would primarily be borne by 
industries in Northern Germany), while Bavaria refused cutting biogas remunerations. These 
states’ interests made their clear imprint on the final version of the law (Gawel, 2014; Gawel 
and Lehmann, 2014). In other words, some Länder tried to reap the regional benefits of RES 
deployment while free-riding on the RES subsidies paid for by all German electricity 
consumers (Gawel and Korte, 2015). In fact, the consideration of regional benefits is also laid 
down in the EEG itself as it is also justified by the promotion of green industry and regional 
development. For example, the the use of biomass for energy purposes is also seen as an 
additional perspective for domestic agriculture and forestry with untapped potential which 
creates jobs and thus strengthens regional economies (Bundestag, 2000). 
Besides regional diversity there may also exist a demand for diversity with respect to investor 
types. This has been recognized at the national levels through a desire to encourage a wider 
diversity of investors to participate in renewable energy investment, including citizens, small-
scale farmers, communities, small businesses and local governments (e.g., Couture et al., 
2015). This can be achieved by keeping the barriers to entry low for certain kinds of market 
participants, while at the same time encouraging competition among larger project developers 
to secure low prices for consumers. Investor diversity arguments may also have repercussions 
for the appropriate choice between technology-specific and technology-neutral RES-E support 
schemes. For instance, tendering schemes have tended to favor large energy companies that 
are able to afford the associated administrative and transaction costs (Lucas et al., 2013), and 
may also create a bias towards certain types of RES-E technologies. Large wind power plants 
could crowd out small biogas projects if the two compete against one another.10 Such 
considerations explain the capacity differentiation in the EEG as well as thresholds for choice 
between fixed FIT and market premium under EEG 2012. Moreover, the current EEG 2014 
explicit mandates to maintain actor diversity with the gradual implementation of tenders (Art. 
2(5) EEG 2014). 
While government decision-makers typically cannot ignore the preferences and the power of 
important stakeholder groups, it should be clear that lobbying may lead to regulatory capture 
and economic inefficiencies. For this reason it becomes important to implement RES-E 
policies that minimize such rent-seeking activities in the first place. It is sometimes argued 
that technology-specific policies are more prone to regulatory capture by different political 
interest groups than technology-neutral ones (Aalbers et al., 2013; Helm, 2010; Lerner, 2009; 
                                                     
10 The desire to promote new and smaller investors can also be viewed as a way to mitigate the presence of 
market power in the electricity system. As such it can then also be motivated from an economic efficiency point 
of view.  
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SVR, 2014) Lobbyists may be more able to seek rents successfully in the case of 
differentiated support levels because their information advantages over regulators will be 
more profound. In the presence of firm-regulator information asymmetries, RES-E plant 
developers will have an incentive to given the impression that generation costs are high in 
order to maximize the likelihood of more generous support.  
For these reasons, it has been argued, technology-neutral RES-E schemes may be less prone 
to interventions by political interest groups, in other words offering a “premium of simplicity” 
(Helm, 2010). A similar argument has been put forward by the so-called Monopolies 
Commission in Germany, an independent expert committee advising the German government 
and legislature in the areas of competition policy-making, competition law, and regulation 
(Monopolkommission, 2013). However, ultimately all types of policies may be eroded by the 
influence of political interest groups, even those which were meant to be technology-neutral 
in the first place (Strunz et al., 2015a). An apt example is carbon dioxide emissions trading in 
the EU where the alleged textbook simplicity in part vanished during the implementation 
process (e.g., Anger et al., 2008; Spash, 2010).11 
To conclude, we argue that considering the political economy environment yields two 
important policy implications: First, RES-E schemes tend to be technology-specific in 
practice as they emerge from the complex interactions of political interest groups. That is, 
even if technology-neutral support was a cost-effective way to promote RES-E, it might be, 
for several reasons, a politically not preferable alternative. Second, the political economy 
environment will also impair the implementation of a possibly cost-effective, technology-
specific RES-E scheme. That is, even if economic rationales for technology differentiation are 
relevant, they may not materialize in actually existing RES-E schemes.  
4 Concluding Remarks 
The central conclusion from this paper is that technology-specific RES-E support schemes 
may generate significant economic benefits, particularly if technology markets work 
imperfectly and in second-best settings with additional non-internalized market failures. The 
former becomes particularly important when RES-E technologies play a role in complying 
with long-term policy (e.g., climate) targets. This is not to say that technology-specific 
support schemes are by definition welfare-increasing; there will clearly be practical 
impediments to getting the technology-specific remuneration levels right. But in fact the same 
is true for technology-neutral approaches. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that technology-
neutral schemes are neither by definition superior, and they hardly deserve to be treated as a 
benchmark in the analysis of cost-effective deployment of RES-E technologies. In the end this 
boils down to the notion that a RES-E target cannot be a desirable goal in itself; it must be 
logically derivable by analysis of more basic motives and of the relevant costs and constraints. 
Our point is that almost regardless of which these motives are, there is generally a stronger 
case to be made for technology differentiation compared to technology neutrality. 
                                                     
11 This insight is in fact confirmed by Helm (2010), who reports that due to lobbying efforts technology-specific 
bands were introduced for the originally technology-neutral concept of UK’s renewable obligation certificates. 
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